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Table of contents
- Guide A Sketch of the Modern Languages of Africa: Volume II: Volume 90 (Trubners Oriental Series)
- Language 90's
- Poetry Books
- References - A History of African Linguistics
The interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised—. To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may be inferred. For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things to indifference.
Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them, are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the manifestation as blue and  so forth is a presentment of activity, as it has been said—.
Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible, which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of presentments resulting from ideation. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment or sensation ; the antecedent momentary object sensation in the mental train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted to exercise such causality.
It must therefore be stated that all momentary objects fleeting sensations in the subject-consciousness are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of presentments of activity.
Guide A Sketch of the Modern Languages of Africa: Volume II: Volume 90 (Trubners Oriental Series)
If any one of these fleeting sensations had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding, must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature of sense percepts the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four conditions.
These four conditions are known as 1. Of these, the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition.
The restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant, the eye, for example, as another condition. We must thus recognise four causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and its modifications.
So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is of five kinds, entitled 1. The perceptional world is the stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity.
The affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal or symbolical world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words—the words "cow," and so forth. Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain, and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the principles, the method of suppressing this pain.
Hence it has been said—. In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the "aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as 1. Of these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious being,—such is the meaning of the aphorism.
To exemplify this. A germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six elements. That which comes into being, provided that something exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of the nature or causal relation. Continuance as a condition is where the effect is not found without its cause. Determination by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions that is, in causes and  effects ; and in all this no intelligent designer is observed.
In this external aggregate neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise unduly prolix.
Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method path, road is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former ideas. Such is the highest mystery. A second school, attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation is the only reality. A third school, who  contend that both are true the internal and the external , and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible.
Their technical language springs up as follows:—According to the doctrine of inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind.
Objects, therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Discrimination, as resulting from the appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.
Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem we may yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver.
It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction  according to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional or orthodox ; for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta—. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. The whole western heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see any abiding colour, any colour which truly is.
Within the millionth part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but because the process is one to which no measurement applies, It is a series of fleeting colours, no one of which is , because each of them continually vanishes in another. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. This is the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by calling it a flux —or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense.
Burnouf, Lotus , p. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. But what we know of organic materials is that they have this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical agency. The Gymnosophists  Jainas , rejecting these opinions of the Muktakachchhas,  and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
They say : If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless.
But surely this can never be imagined as possible—that one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, i.
But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream of momentary sensations has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? Nor may  you object that, 'if this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'—[ i.
As it has been said—. But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma:—. It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the ground.
If you take as your definition of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since this undoubtedly produces the  effect [of fear]. Hence it has been said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration. As for what was said [in p.
References - A History of African Linguistics
As for what was said of the example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is held to be one [throughout all"]. Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation between causes and effects.
For even on your own admission it would follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was enjoyed.
Moreover, on your supposition of momentary existence , as at the time of the perception the second moment the object of the first moment does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of the world would come to an end.
If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the perception and knowledge in each several case.
And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties. If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there would be no perception that the object is insentient,  and so it is a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops. And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing?
How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support? Thus any soul will become omniscient when, its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining the same , the hindrances to such knowledge are done away. Now there is such a soul, which has its hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping  all things remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. By this charm also, all inferior assaults of argument can be put to flight.
There cannot be an omniscient who is eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," like other liberated persons,—since the use of the term "liberated" necessarily  implies the having been previously bound; and if the latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of the ether. You cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma.
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